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Executive summary
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are one of the main obstacles preventing 
China and the European Union from agreeing a bilateral investment agreement (BIT). Given 
the benefits that both China and EU could obtain from a BIT, the question of SOEs should be 
addressed in the most effective way.
We examine the main differences between Chinese and European SOEs, in terms of their 
sectoral coverage and, most importantly, their corporate governance. We argue that preferen-
tial market access for Chinese SOEs in China is the key to their undue competitive advantage 
globally, and is also the reason why global consumers might not necessarily benefit from 
Chinese SOEs in terms of welfare gain.
Preferential market access in China, rather than ownership of SOEs, should be the 
key factor when evaluating the undue advantage enjoyed by Chinese corporates because 
private companies with ties to the Chinese government might also benefit from preferential 
market access.
We also offer a checklist of issues for EU-China investment talks in relation to Chinese 
SOEs. First, creating barriers to prevent Chinese companies acquiring European assets will 
not solve the problem. Instead, equal market access in China is a much better goal to pursue 
in order to reduce the seemingly unlimited resources that Chinese SOEs seem to have to 
compete overseas. Second, bringing Chinese corporate governance closer to global market 
principles is also essential to ensure European and Chinese corporates operate on an equal 
footing in their cross-border investment decisions.
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1  Introduction
Although trade between the European Union and China has been soaring, bilateral invest-
ment has remained moderate. Only quite recently has Chinese outward foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in the EU started to rise substantially, but there is increasing uncertainty about 
whether this can continue. At the same time, European FDI in China has remained stagnant 
as European companies increasingly struggle on the Chinese market.
Aware of the potential benefits of FDI, the EU and China have been negotiating a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) for more than three years, with the objectives of unifying and further 
relaxing restrictions on FDI, and of putting on an equal footing Chinese and EU investors and 
EU member states, most of which already have BITs with China. In the same vein, the United 
States has also been negotiating a BIT with China.
While the content of the negotiations is not fully disclosed, either for the US or the EU BIT 
with China, there are enough official statements and even official updates on the negotiations 
from European Commission to argue that the dominance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in China is clearly a difficult issue. More specifically, the EU argues that SOEs do not follow 
market principles fully, partly because of the explicit or implicit government support they 
receive, and this undermines market efficiency. In addition, there is also a disagreement over 
how to settle disputes between investors, in particular those that involve SOEs. The treatment 
of SOEs seems to have become one of the most contentious aspects of the ongoing negotia-
tions on an EU-China BIT. 
We suggest ways in which the EU and China can enhance their bilateral investments while 
protecting their interests and understanding the differences in their economic structures. 
In other words, China, with an economy that continues to be state-driven to a considerable 
extent, will need to make changes to allow for equal treatment in market access, while the EU 
will need to acknowledge the role that SOEs play in China’s economic model. 
We start with a comparison between the roles played by Chinese SOEs and by their 
European counterparts, finding striking differences in their sectoral coverage. We then look 
at two major concerns about Chinese SOEs: preferential treatment by government, and their 
non-commercial objectives. Though these concerns might be justified, there could be similar 
concerns about private companies, especially if they are large enough and operate in strategic 
sectors in which natural security could potentially be at stake. On this basis, we offer guide-
lines on the treatment of SOEs in a potential EU-China BIT. The key issue is market access 
in China, to guide Chinese SOE behaviour in Europe and to ensure European companies in 
China can operate on an equal footing. We argue that focusing on market access – rather than 
on type of ownership – is more relevant for the EU-China BIT negotiations. Finally, we con-
sider the SOE chapter of the recently concluded EU-Vietnam free trade agreement (FTA)1 as a 
potential benchmark for the ongoing negotiations between China and the EU.
2 The EU-China investment relationship
Economic cooperation between China and the EU has increased over the past thirty years to 
the point where the EU is now China’s largest trading partner, and China is the EU’s second 
largest trading partner after the United States. Nevertheless, bilateral FDI has until quite re-
cently remained relatively subdued, especially China’s outward FDI. In 2011, China’s outward 
FDI (including that from Hong Kong) accounted for only 1 percent of EU total inward FDI, 
whereas China took 3.5 percent of the EU’s outward FDI. Given the size of the Chinese econo-
my in the world already in 2011, this can be considered relatively modest. 
1  At time of writing, the EU-Vietnam free trade agreement had been reached but not implemented.
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More recently, Chinese have entrepreneurs started to head abroad for direct investment 
and Chinese FDI in the EU has scaled up. The push factor for Chinese investors has been 
decreasing returns on domestic investment; the pull factor has been more availability of 
potential investments since the global financial crisis and their relatively lower cost. Against 
this backdrop, Chinese FDI in the EU soared to about €20 billion in 2015. The EU has become 
one of China’s key destinations, accounting for 41.9 percent of China’s total direct investment 
in the developed economies . Chinese FDI has also become increasingly relevant for the EU, 
making up 8 percent of FDI inflows in 2015. Meanwhile, EU investment in China has been 
quite erratic during the last few years, but did decrease substantially from €20.9 billion in 2013 
to €6.9 billion in 2015  (Figures 1 and 2). The closer investment relationship between China 
and the EU is more apparent in their relative shares compared to other partners, with China’s 
share leaping significantly in 2014 (Table 1).
Figure 1: Chinese FDI transactions in the EU (€ millions)
Source: Bruegel based on Hanemann and Huotari (2016).
Figure 2: EU FDI transactions in China (€ millions)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
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Table 1: Partners’ shares of EU outward and inward FDI
 Outward FDI flows Inward FDI flows
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Europe (non-
EU, including 
EFTA)
20.92% 23.24% 10.63% -68.12% 13.27% 21.75% -0.56% 43.27%
United States 34.26% 39.44% 50.19% -142.85% 60.97% 38.62% 69.60% -25.10%
Japan 3.51% 5.15% 3.83% 15.14% 1.03% 2.73% 1.30% 7.97%
China 0.91% 0.31% 1.50% -0.99% 2.43% 0.57% 1.91% 10.70%
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
In terms of Chinese FDI in Europe, there has also been a sea-change in terms of desti-
nation. A decade ago, Chinese FDI was concentrated in the European ‘big three’ economies 
(Germany, the UK and France). But by 2015, southern European economies accounted for 
almost half of all Chinese direct investment in the EU.
The rapid increase in FDI has triggered more frequent high-level exchanges between EU 
countries and China, and has occasionally led also to frictions and disputes. To further elimi-
nate obstacles to bilateral FDI, China and the EU started to negotiate a BIT in November 2013. 
This has not happened in a vacuum as nearly all EU countries (except Ireland) already have 
a BIT in place with China; most of these treaties were agreed between the 1980s and early 
1990s. The objectives of those treaties, however, were to bring FDI into China while protecting 
the legitimate operations of foreign businesses. The role of China in the global economy has 
changed and these old treaties clearly need to be updated. Some EU countries have upgraded 
their BITs with China (Table 2). The other very relevant reason to revisit the existing treaties 
between China and EU countries is that the responsibility for agreeing BITs is longer in the 
hands of member states, since the agreement of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Negotiation of BITs 
is now the responsibility of the European Commission and a new EU-China BIT would cover 
the whole of the EU. 
In the absence of an EU-China BIT, there are wide disparities between the existing BIT 
treaties between China and EU member countries. In particular, China and central and 
eastern European countries have established the 16+12 initiative to intensify and expand 
economic cooperation in a wide range of areas, including investment. The initiative seeks to 
enhance cooperation in three key fields: infrastructure, high technology and green tech-
nology. While these policies are generally handled at the level of member states, they are 
coordinated at European level. In some instances, such as transportation, EU planning 
financing coordination is involved3. The fact that China negotiates bilaterally with these 
countries potentially complicates that coordination, and also reduces the negotiating power 
of the EU as a whole. This is why the 16+1 initiative may be thought of as a strategy for China 
to influence EU policies from within, primarily with the aim of forcing through policies that 
are favourable to China4.
2   The 16+1 format covers China, 11 EU countries and 5 Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgar-
ia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia). 
3   For example, the EU initiative to foster the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).
4   Dragan Pavlicevic, ‘China in Central and Eastern Europe: 4 Myths’, The Diplomat, 16 June 2016.
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Table 2: China’s existing BITs with EU member states
Signature Date Valid Date Remarks
Sweden
29/03/1982 29/03/1982
27/09/2004 27/09/2004 Valid since signature
Germany
10/07/1983 18/03/1985
01/12/2003 11/11/2005 re-signed
France
30/05/1984 19/03/1985
26/11/2007 20/08/2010 re-signed
Belgium and Luxembourg
04/06/1984 05/10/1986
06/06/2005 01/12/2009 re-signed
Finland
09/04/1984 26/01/1986
15/11/2004 15/11/2006 re-signed
Norway 21/11/1984 10/07/1985
Italy 28/01/1985 28/08/1987
Denmark 29/041985 29/04/1985
Netherlands
17/06/1985 01/02/1987
26/11/2001 01/08/2004 re-signed
Austria 12/09/1985 11/10/1986
UK 15/05/1986 15/05/1986
Poland 07/06/1988 08/01/1989
Bulgaria
27/06/1989 21/08/1994
26/06/2007 10/11/2007 re-signed
Hungary 29/05/1991 01/04/1993
Czech and Slovak 12/04/1991 01/12/1992
Slovak 07/12/2005 25/05/2007 new revision
Portugal
03/02/1992 01/12/1992
09/12/2005 26/07/2008 re-signed
Spain
06/02/1992 01/05/1993
24/11/2005 01/07/2008 re-signed
Greece 25/06/1992 21/12/1993
Croatia 07/06/1993 01/07/1994
Estonia 02/09/1993 01/06/1994
Slovenia 13/09/1993 01/01/1995
Lithuania 08/11/1993 01/06/1994
Romania
12/07/1994 01/09/1995
16/04/2007 01/09/2008 revised
Malta 22/02/2009 01/04/2009
Cyprus 17/01/2001 29/04/2002
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce.
At the same time, there are two main reasons for the European Commission to push for a 
BIT with China. First, since the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2009, the Commission has had full 
responsibility for investment issues. Second, the Commission wants to avoid unfair competi-
tion between EU countries for Chinese investment. 
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In this context, the EU and China have agreed to pursue a deal that would protect invest-
ment, increase market access and address key challenges related to the regulatory environ-
ment, including those related to transparency, licensing and authorisation5. Although most of 
these issues are covered by existing bilateral agreements, an EU-level BIT with China provides 
a new opportunity to further reduce barriers to investment and boost bilateral FDI. The BIT 
also offers great benefits to China, given the rapid increase in Chinese investment in Euro-
pean Union countries in the last few years. Furthermore, a successful EU-China BIT could 
pave the way to a potential free trade agreement (FTA). 
The twelfth round of EU-China BIT negotiations was wrapped up in September 2016 in 
Brussels. On a number of issues, however, there is no clear convergence between the two 
negotiating parties. A key point of difference appears to be market access. Market access for 
EU investors in China is restricted. China is one of the most restrictive countries in terms of 
market access for foreign investors, according to an index of restrictiveness in market access 
compiled by the OECD6. Beyond market access, EU authorities are concerned about potential 
discrimination against EU investors operating in China, including explicit or implicit prefer-
ential subsidies for certain enterprises. Such discrimination may also be a factor for Chinese 
companies operating in Europe. While market access is a more general issue, potential 
discrimination by means of implicit or explicit subsidies has linkages to the role played by 
Chinese SOEs. This is not only true for the Chinese economy, but also for Chinese investment 
in Europe because a good part of it (most of it until very recently) originates from SOEs. 
As such, understanding the behaviour of Chinese SOEs, including how they differ from 
their European counterparts, is crucial for any further negotiations on the EU-China BIT.
3  What is special about SOEs? A comparison 
between the EU and China
Theoretically, the most convincing justification for the existence of SOEs is achieving social 
objectives and/or correcting market failures. As such, most SOEs do not need to pursue a 
profit maximisation objective, and are often strictly regulated and assessed by government. 
In China, SOEs have a much wider scope as they originate from the planned economy era 
when they dominated all sectors (either SOEs or collectively-owned companies). Most Chi-
nese SOEs, even now, are not established on the basis of correcting market failure, but more 
to carry out government objectives.
Chinese SOEs: bigger, more pervasive and more dominant than their EU 
counterparts
Although China started on its path of market reform and openness in the 1980s, it was only 
in the 1990s that reform started to have an impact on SOEs – a movement that happened 
under the slogan ‘Grasping the large, letting go of the small’. The aim of that wave of reform 
was to limit the influence of the government over small-scale SOEs by transforming them into 
private firms or merging them with large state-owned enterprises. As a result, the number of 
SOEs declined more rapidly than SOEs’ share of employees (Figure 3). In other words, SOEs 
became larger on average. Another important consequence was that a good part of the private 
firms existing in China today were SOEs until the late 1990s, meaning their current owners 
still have connections, directly or indirectly, with the Chinese government.
5   European Commission, DG Trade, ‘EU and China agree on scope of the future investment deals’, 15 January 2016, 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1435.
6   OECD Database: FDI regulatory restrictiveness index, updated on 27 March 2017.
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Figure 3: Chinese SOEs, shares of employees and profits
Source: Bruegel based on China Statistics Yearbook. Note: Data for number of SOEs is missing from 2003-05, so the plots are smoothed 
over the three year period.
Since the late-1990s reforms, the Chinese government has pursued a number of initiatives 
to reform SOEs, but the logic has switched away from privatisation to improving efficiency 
while maintaining the role of the state in the production of goods and services. The ultimate 
objective of the ongoing reform has shifted to creating corporate giants that can compete 
globally7. Those giants remain state-controlled, especially in strategic sectors. Nearly 70 per-
cent of the Chinese firms in the Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s largest public compa-
nies are SOEs8. However, in terms of the share of SOEs in the market value of its largest com-
panies, China ranks third globally after Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (OECD, 2016). 
State-owned enterprises in the EU are of a very different nature. They are generally smaller 
than Chinese SOEs. They are typically found in sectors affected by potential market failure 
and externalities, such as utilities. Figure 4 shows SOEs’ share of total employment in 21 EU 
countries. Together, the EU’s SOEs have an employment share below 10 percent, which is 
much lower than that of the SOEs in China in 2015.
Figure 4: Employment in SOEs, % of total employment
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2016), OECD, World Bank and Eurostat.
7   Colin Simpson, ‘China’s Reform of SOEs May Look a Little Odd to the West: Goldman’, Bloomberg, 8 September 
2016, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-08/goldman-sachs-sees-chinese-soe-re-
form-just-not-as-west-knows-it. 
8  See Forbes Global 2000, https://www.forbes.com/global2000/. 
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Though relatively large, Chinese SOEs tend to perform worse than their private peers. We 
calculated the assets and profit distribution of Chinese listed companies – SOEs and private 
firms. On average, SOEs own more assets than private firms but their profitability is lower 
(Figure 5). Our results are in line with those of Hsieh and Song (2015). 
Figure 5: State-owned enterprises (SOEs) versus private-owned enterprises 
(POEs) in asset and profit performance
Source: Bruegel. Note: we calculated the probability distribution of the listed companies’ assets (left) and profits (right) for Chinese 
SOEs andPOEs separately. To make sure our results are not sensitive to extreme values, data is truncated with firms above and below 5 
percentiles for both variables.
Another important characteristic of Chinese SOEs is their industry coverage. Chinese 
SOEs seem to be much more engaged in manufacturing than European SOEs. More than 30 
percent of Chinese SOEs are in the manufacturing sector and 55 percent of SOE employees 
work for manufacturing firms. The equivalent EU figures are 2.8 percent and 4.8 percent 
(Table 3). This is not so surprising if we consider that the manufacturing sector is larger in 
China, but this is not the whole story. The figures also highlight the Chinese government’s 
industrial policy to develop what has long been a key strategic sector.
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Table 3: Sectoral distribution of SOEs in China and the EU: number of firms and 
employment
Number of sectorial 
SOEs/Total SOEs  
Employment of 
sectorial SOEs/ Total 
SOEs
China EU China EU
Agriculture, forest, fishing 2.21% 0.70% 1.69% 2.48%
Manufacturing 31.32% 2.81% 55.48% 4.81%
Services 66.47% 96.49% 42.83% 92.71%
Source: Bruegel based on Source: (1) Chinese National Bureau of Statistics; (2) Author’s calculation based on BvD Amadeus/Orbis data 
set. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) presents a comprehensive introduction of the dataset.  
To further highlight the extensive presence of SOEs in China, even among large firms, 
Table 4 shows the sectoral breakdown of the revenues of Chinese firms for state-owned, 
private-owned and foreign-owned firms. Chinese SOEs lead in many strategically important 
sectors beyond manufacturing, while foreign ownership is very limited even in sectors that 
are officially open to foreign competition.
Table 4: Sectorial sales distribution of SOEs, POEs and FOEs in China in 2008
SOE POE FOE
Health 58.92% 41.06% 0.02%
Wholesale and Retail 2.20% 97.73% 0.08%
Construction 24.43% 75.26% 0.30%
Culture 54.71% 44.36% 0.94%
Education 34.06% 64.85% 1.09%
Finance 21.74% 76.78% 1.48%
Accommodation 25.96% 71.60% 2.44%
Real Estate 7.32% 90.11% 2.57%
Environment 43.65% 53.51% 2.83%
Research 33.94% 62.28% 3.78%
Lease and Business 26.94% 64.65% 8.41%
Restaurant 4.00% 86.96% 9.04%
Manufacturing 15.11% 75.26% 9.63%
Source: Bruegel based on China’s Economic Census Data. Note: FOE = foreign-owned enterprise
The special environment for Chinese SOEs
The fact that Chinese SOEs are generally larger and more pervasive than their global peers, 
but are also less profitable than private companies has its roots in the special corporate 
governance of SOEs. The appointment of SOEs’ managers is still political, at least to some 
extent. Before 1992, SOEs’ managers were government officials. After China’s deepening 
market economy reform, the method of selecting SOE leaders was changed to a combina-
tion of official recommendation and market recruitment. Nevertheless, given that most SOE 
executives still retain an administrative rank, prospects for promotion in SOEs are significant-
ly influenced by political decisions. A second reason for the relatively lower profitability of 
Chinese SOEs is their compliance with non-economic administrative orders. This is very hard 
to quantify but can be illustrated by a number of examples. A well-known issue is the treat-
ment of overcapacity in SOEs. Bankruptcy is not an option for fear of its social impact through 
increased unemployment. Therefore, many steel companies have had no choice but to turn 
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into unprofitable ‘zombie enterprises’. Such non-economic orders can come from local, as 
well as central, government. A recent example is the Beijing government’s political objective 
to reduce the population density in Beijing. To do this, the Beijing government requires some 
SOEs in Beijing’s urban region to move to suburban areas, regardless of the potentially nega-
tive impacts on profits and employees9. 
However, it is also because of SOEs’ connections to the political hierarchy that they have 
access to benefits from the government, such as cheaper and easier access to financing than 
is available to private enterprises. Other sources of preferential treatment for SOEs seem to 
raise even greater levels of concern, according to an OECD survey (Table 5).  
Table 5: Types of preferential treatment for SOE investments
Type of preferential treatment
Level of concern
Strong Somewhat Low
Preferential financing 15% 62% 23%
Explicit/implicit guarantee 15% 31% 54%
Outright subsidies 38% 23% 39%
Regulatory exemptions 25% 33% 42%
Position in domestic marketplace 38% 39% 23%
Access to state information 46% 36% 18%
Source: OECD (2016).
Will global consumers benefit from Chinese SOEs? Not necessarily
One could make a case that Chinese SOEs might not foster competition but could still be 
good for global consumers because they drive prices down even in tradable sectors, such as 
manufacturing. More specifically, given the intrinsic advantages SOEs have, coupled with 
their relatively lower profitability and managerial efficiency, the key question is whether 
such undue advantages can enable SOEs to set lower-than-equilibrium prices, which could 
possibly undercut competitors. Even if Chinese SOEs are capable of setting prices lower than 
their marginal costs because of subsidies (ie conduct dumping policies), and could thus 
weaken the EU’s competitive environment, the final impact on welfare for the EU is ambigu-
ous, because the consumer can benefit from lower prices and increased product variety. In 
that regard, market access seems to be the key factor for tilting the balance from a positive to 
a negative impact, according to Brander and Krugman (1983). In other words, market access 
helps maintain consumer welfare when dumping happens. The problem is that market access 
is indeed an issue in China, not only for foreign companies but even for private Chinese com-
panies. This is why it is hard to argue that consumer welfare might be increased as a conse-
quence of lower prices being set by Chinese SOEs.
Should the focus be on SOEs when looking at market dominance and its 
consequences?
Chinese private firms, including many in the manufacturing sector, were partially privatised 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s but still retain strong connections to the Chinese govern-
ment. More specifically, five percent of Chinese private firms are under the direct control of 
Communist Party of China (CPC) members (Milhaupt and Zheng, 2015), and even non-party 
9 McKinsey & Company Blog, ‘Why China Should Move State-Owned Enterprises Out of Beijing’, 22 October 2015,  
available at http://mckinseychina.com/why-china-should-move-state-owned-enterprises-out-of-beijing/.
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entrepreneurs are also likely to pursue political resources and sometimes recruit CPC mem-
bers or those people with relationships with government, in order to improve their chances 
of accessing scarce resources. A striking example is that more than 150 Chinese billionaires 
belong to a group of lawmakers in the National People’s Congress, China’s top legislature, 
or to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the leading political advisory 
board10. More generally, Milhaupt and Zheng (2015) show striking similarities between SOEs 
and some special private companies, leading them to argue that “drawing a stark distinction 
between SOEs and privately owned firms (POEs) misperceives the reality of China’s institu-
tional environment.” In the same vein, a number of surveys conducted by Chinese officials11 
show that private firms directly owned by Party members and those related to political elites 
obtained significantly more bank loans than others. This result is also verified by Kung and Ma 
(2014), who find that China’s poor environment in terms of property rights has not affected pri-
vate enterprises much because, in such an environment, many private business owners devote 
time and money to developing political connections with the government in exchange for loos-
er regulation and easier access to finance, which is similar to the general environment for SOEs.
4 The EU’s concerns about Chinese SOEs: is 
it seeing the whole picture?
The increasing economic magnitude of China’s SOEs, and their eagerness to acquire foreign 
assets, has come as a shock for many European corporates. Some examples of recent Eu-
ropean acquisitions by Chinese corporates are Pirelli by ChemChina and Louvre Hotels by 
Shanghai Jinjiang.  
While Chinese corporates expand abroad, EU corporates seem to have increasing diffi-
culty in accessing China’s market. In this context, China has introduced a massive plan to sup-
port its own manufacturing industrial, the China Manufacturing 2025 Initiative. The ultimate 
goal of this initiative is to further enhance competitiveness in ten critical sectors, including 
new energy and rail transport equipment. Because targets have been set for the amount of 
local content, it seems clear that this plan will make it even more difficult for foreign investors 
to access China’s market. According to a business confidence survey conducted in 2016, 57 
percent of European firms believe that China’s environmental regulations strongly disadvan-
tage foreign companies (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016).
Chinese SOEs, aided by government industrial policy support schemes, have become 
major competitors for European firms. Figure 6 shows the number of companies included 
in the Forbes Global 2000 from China and ten major European countries. Excluding the UK, 
the number of Chinese Forbes Global 2000 firms has already reached the sum of the number 
of firms from all the other nine countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, Sweden, 
Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark). Competitive concerns are especially pressing for Euro-
pean manufacturers, because manufacturing is where China traditionally has a comparative 
advantage, and because of China’s ambitious Manufacturing 2025 Initiative, which seeks to 
further strengthen the competitiveness of Chinese firms.
10  CNN, ‘China’s richest lawmakers are worth over $500 billion’, 3 March 2017, available at http://money.cnn.
com/2017/03/03/news/economy/billionaire-chinese-lawmakers-npc/. 
11  The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews in 1995, 2000, 2006 and 2010 by a CPC central commit-
tee department, the United Front Work Department, and two ministry level central government agencies, The Na-
tional Association of Industry and Commerce, and The State Administration for Industry and Commerce. To make 
the survey representative of the population of nationwide registered private firms, a stratified random sampling 
procedure was applied. See Guo et al (2014).
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Figure 6: Forbes 2000 companies for China and selected European countries
Source: Bruegel based on Forbes.
Against this backdrop, the EU is also taking steps to revive its industrial sector but within 
a very different framework, which aims to preserve competition and avoiding distortions 
(Veugelers, 2013). China’s rising SOEs and the support they receive undoubtedly challenge 
the EU’s spirit of competition and even its industrial policy. As such, correcting the apparently 
undue advantages that Chinese SOEs enjoy is an obvious policy target for the EU in the ongo-
ing negotiations with China on a BIT. 
From a practical point of view, however, targeting SOEs in the BIT negotiation might not 
be the best strategy for the EU to tackle this concern. As we have noted, a number of Chinese 
private companies also benefit from political access, similarly to the SOEs. If the EU were to 
set particularly rigorous rules for Chinese SOEs, it could leave more room for politically-con-
nected Chinese private firms to gain government support for mergers and acquisitions in the 
European market. It is also hard to argue that all Chinese SOEs behave in the same way. Zhao 
(2015) finds evidence of a competitive environment for a number of Chinese SOEs insofar as 
they make investment decisions without government influence.
On this basis, the EU should not impose specific conditions on SOEs within the EU-China 
BIT, but should rather push for general policies that apply to both SOEs and private compa-
nies. In other words, instead of focusing on ownership, the EU should look into the state-cen-
tred institutional framework in which firms operate in China and how that might give them 
an advantage over European companies. The most important advantage Chinese companies 
enjoy is the difficult access to the Chinese market that their foreign competitors face. There-
fore, liberalising market access is the most urgent step to be taken in order to create a level 
playing field so that European firms can compete with Chinese SOEs. This relates to the 
second aspect of the EU-China BIT: European investment in China.
European companies investing in China 
European companies have long been present in China and have accumulated a stock of 
FDI of €357 billion if Hong Kong is included. Though the flow of FDI has stagnated since 2011, 
China remains an important market for many European corporations.
From the perspective of European companies investing in China, the first and foremost 
issue is market access. The EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing has reported increasingly 
unfair treatment of foreign companies (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 
2016a), and the OECD ranks China the second most restrictive country for FDI in the world, 
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with only the Philippines more restrictive12. The question is whether this is related to the per-
vasive role of SOEs in the Chinese economy. 
The answer, from our perspective, is that even Chinese private companies are denied 
access to some key sectors in the Chinese market on the grounds of security (including 
economic security) and based on a web of different laws and regulations, the most impor-
tant being the anti-monopoly law. As we have shown (Table 4), the sectoral distribution of 
Chinese SOEs confirms that they are particularly favoured in the sectors considered strategi-
cally important by the government, including energy, infrastructure, utilities and finance. The 
EU Chamber of Commerce in China (2016b) finds these sectors to be the most difficult for 
European firms to access.
5 Policy suggestions for the European Union
Our analysis shows that Chinese SOEs differ from European SOEs in many ways and repre-
sent a risk of unfair competition for EU companies in both China and Europe. However, the 
EU should not over-focus on SOEs in the EU-China BIT negotiations because some large 
Chinese private companies also benefit from preferential market access in China, which also 
gives them a comparative advantage when operating abroad. 
The first priority issue that an EU-China BIT should pursue is market liberalisation, so that 
any market access granted through the BIT puts European companies on an equal footing to 
their Chinese competitors (even with SOEs). This obviously requires, at least, reciprocity. In 
fact, market liberalisation is important not only for foreign companies but also for Chinese 
private companies so that gains are also shared with China (European Parliament, 2016).
Within the negotiation of the EU-China BIT, it seems important for the EU to continue to 
pursue reciprocity in terms of the treatment of corporate governance and, more generally, 
market access. Many concerns about the behaviour of SOEs are rooted in their complex 
corporate structures, which result in limited disclosure of their financial information. Beyond 
the EU’s bilateral negotiations with China, one could think of other – multilateral – venues 
through which to pursue more market-driven corporate governance for Chinese SOEs. The 
most obvious route would be for China to become a member of OECD or, at least, to comply 
voluntarily with global principles of corporate governance. Such measures would be in the 
EU’s interests and in the interests of China, which has repeatedly declared its determination 
to continue with its economic liberalisation. Pressure from the EU can only but help Chinese 
authorities push for further liberalisation.
In terms of specific aims for the EU-China BIT, the first priority, clearly based on the 
principle of reciprocity, should be that China’s ‘negative list’ for market access should be nar-
rowed considerably and extended beyond China’s special economic zones to the whole Chi-
nese territory. This goal remains distant as China’s negative list continues to get longer, under-
pinned by a law that can limit investment for national security – or even economic – reasons13. 
FDI is highly restricted in China outside the special economic zones, with foreign investment 
permitted in very few sectors (positive list) and requirements to comply with as many as three 
foreign company laws14. A shorter negative list with broader coverage would significantly lift 
12 OECD Database: FDI regulatory restrictiveness index, updated on 27 March 2017
13 China has stipulated rigorous censorship rules even for the special free trade zones. See http://www.gov.cn/
zhengce/content/2015-04/20/content_9629.htm. 
14 ‘China advances foreign investment and negative list reform with seventh draft catalogue’, see http://www.linklat-
ers.com/Insights/AsiaNews/LinkstoChina/Pages/China-advances-foreign-investment-negative-list-reform-sev-
enth-draft-catalogue.aspx. 
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market access restrictions in the currently prohibited industries for EU companies. Opening 
up more sectors would be mutually beneficial, as it would help China further liberalise. 
The second issue for the EU-China BIT relates to market access beyond the treatment of 
foreign companies. As we have noted, a key advantage for Chinese SOEs is their favourable 
access to certain industries. The Chinese government sometimes even uses anti-monopoly 
laws to protect the interests of some specific companies – and not only SOEs (Epstein, 2014). 
Revising the anti-monopoly law and other legal protections that benefit SOEs relative to other 
corporations are also essential and would be beneficial for China. 
Third, the EU should build a firewall against potential problems related to Chinese invest-
ment in Europe. The two key instruments in this respect are the EU’s competition policy and 
dispute resolution framework to regulate the operations of Chinese SOEs in the EU. Identify-
ing unfair behaviour by a firm can be easier after a firm reveals its status by operating in the 
EU market. An appropriate dispute settlement mechanism can protect both European and 
Chinese corporates. Among the different options, an investor-state dispute settlement system 
(ISDS) seems to be favoured15 internationally, but would need to be revised so that govern-
ments (either China or EU governments) do not fall prey to corporates suing them without 
clear justification. Furthermore, in the Chinese case, the very close links between corporates 
and the Chinese government (especially when operating abroad) could make ISDS a double 
edged sword for the EU, because in certain cases China could, for its own purposes, support 
its enterprises in suing EU companies. In addition, the implementation of the ISDS might 
be difficult in China where experience with investor-state arbitration is rather limited and 
there is very low probability that the Chinese government will enforce foreign court decisions 
(US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016). A revision of the ISDS is thus 
warranted to balance the interests of the parties in the BIT negotiation16.
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